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Pervasive   networking   capability   is   a   requirement   for   complete   physical-digital
integration and wireless is the obvious medium for this.   Existing wireless networks
come in many forms, ranging from cellular networks spanning hundreds of kilometres,
through enterprise WiFi networks, localised WiFi hot-spots and home networks covering
a single building and finally personal area networks spanning tens of meters.  In such
networks security is typically only possible when either the entire infrastructure is
owned and managed by a single organisation (cellular, Enterprise WiFi and hot-spots),
or when there is a single or small number of users (home networks and PANs).  In the
former a central database is used containing all user credentials, in the latter a shared
secret is typically used.
Neither of these approaches is suitable for sharing connectivity.   For example, close
friends and family members may want to give each other access to wireless networks in
their home without running open networks which anybody can connect to.  A shared
password is not desirable, and a central database is not practical for the home network.
Although I have introduced my research as being primarily concerned with security and
trust, my initial work was more concerned with routing protocols and radio issues
arising from so called "meshed networks".  A mesh network is one where access points
forward packets to each other over wireless, allowing otherwise separate access points
to combine into a single network providing seamless mobility and hand-overs.
This approach eliminates some of the security problems, for example one can envisage a
mesh network where traffic between neighbouring nodes is forwarded freely but traffic
off the mesh is subjected to local firewalling and authentication.  In contrast to when an
access point is stand-alone and must authenticate each and every user.  Whilst this side-
steps the security issues rather than addressing them, it is an interesting solution to the
problem, with the added advantage of providing complete blanket wireless coverage.
The remainder of this report is structured as follows:
1. Background research in wireless networking technologies and mesh routing.
2. Testbed network deployment and results
3. Refocus of research into sharing connectivity4. Background research in trust mechanisms and implementations in the wireless area.
5. Application of ad-hoc routing mechanisms to trust problems
6. Conclusions and future workInitial Research
The desire for high speed, low cost, pervasive wireless data connectivity has never been
greater.  Indeed it is so widely recognised that people have set up community wireless
network initiatives worldwide
1.  These networks vary in their goals, some intend to build
wireless backbones whilst others aim to provide coverage by sharing private broadband
connections.  Such networks are typically run open (i.e. without security) or use MAC
based filtering and a web portal such as NoCat
2, which will be discussed further later.
In this section I discuss the different technologies and research relevant to the area of
pervasive wireless networks.
Wireless Network Technologies
There are essentially 2 approaches to providing wireless network connectivity, firstly
the mobile phone cellular networks which span entire countries or continents and
secondly the short-range, low power 802.11 home/business wireless network covering
inside buildings and small outdoor areas.  802.11 networks have data rates far in excess
of those currently offered by mobile networks, a trend that can only be expected to
continue due to issues such as coverage area and battery life.  In the pervasive world
devices are likely to be just as interested in connecting to local services as those on the
Internet, for example a wireless digital camera sending pictures to a nearby display and
then uploading them to a website.  Indeed many of the next generation mobile phone
handsets are set to have integrated GSM, WiFi and Bluetooth.
It seems that if we could better utilise these smaller, local wireless networks that in
urban areas especially we would be able to benefit from better, cheaper connectivity
than is available with a cellular network.  There are many different wireless protocols,
the following provides an overview of the current most popular standards and their
capabilities.
802.11
In 1997 the IEEE ratified the ANSI/IEEE 802.11 specification[1], specifying the MAC
and  Physical   layers   of   a   wireless   communications   protocol.     This   initial  standard
1 FreeNetworks.org - http://freenetworks.org/
2 NoCatNet - http://nocat.netsupported   data   rates  of   1   or  2Mbit   only,  deployment  was   fairly   sparse,   typically
restricted to industrial and warehouse environments.   It included 3 physical layer
definitions, 2 in the 2.4GHz spectrum and 1 using IR.
In 1999 the standard was extended, adding 5.5 and 11Mbit data rates to the DSSS
(Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum) physical layer, this standard is the now widespread
802.11b[2].   802.11b has been hugely successful, with demand driving new faster
standards running at up to 54MBit.  All of the standards utilise license-free parts of the
radio spectrum, either 2.4GHz (802.11, 11b and 11g) or 5Ghz (802.11a).  These public
frequencies are limited to low transmit power levels in many countries, for example
100mW in the UK
3.  Communication range stretches from under 100m indoors to several
kilometres given line of sight and suitable directional antenna.
A typical 802.11 deployment consists of one or more access points connected to a
common wired backbone, wireless clients connect to the access point with the strongest
signal and can freely migrate between APs with no loss of connectivity.  There is no
direct communication between the access points via the wireless medium, handovers
are handled via the wired backbone.
There are also two alternative modes of operation defined by the specification:
The first is Ad-Hoc mode.  This is a standard feature present in client adapters, it is
designed   to  allow  communication   to occur   directly   between  clients  without  a  co-
ordinating access point.  The radio layer assumes that all clients are within range of
each other and thus does not re-transmit packets, although it is possible to over-come
this restriction by forcing hosts to re-transmit at the IP or Network layer.  Ad-Hoc mode
is not ideally suited for large networks as the stations attempt to form a virtual network
called an IBSS.  Each IBSS has an ID taken from the MAC address of the station which
created it, stations which join the IBSS use this ID to identify it and provided that at
least 1 node remains running the ID will continue to exist.   Problems arise when
merging multiple IBSS networks, for example when 2 initially disconnected networks
become linked by a new host then they will not merge as one might expect, instead the
joining host must choose one network ID or the other.
3 UK Interface Requirement 2005:
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/ra/publication/interface/word-pdf/ir2005.pdfThe second mode is wireless bridging or WDS, this feature is present in most access
points and is often used to connected 2 wired networks together via a point to point
wireless link.  Implementations typically have 2 modes of operation, point to point and
point to multi-point, only access points in point to point mode can connect to those in
multi-point   mode,   giving   rise   to   star   topology   networks.     More   advanced
implementations allow arbitrary links between access points, with each access point
running spanning tree to create a single Ethernet network.
Bluetooth
Bluetooth is primarily aimed at personal area networks, the specification[3]  includes
various profiles such as headset, phone and computer which devices can assume and
then communicate directly with each other.  For example any Bluetooth headset should
work with any other Bluetooth phone, provided they both comply with the specification.
Bluetooth was designed to run on small low-power devices and, consequently has a very
low throughput compared to recent 802.11 standards, the total capacity of a Bluetooth
link being just 1 MBit.  Transmit powers are also typically very low, the specification
defines 3 classes of device operating at 1, 2.5 and 100mw, however only PC powered
dongles or access points typically operate in the latter range.
All Bluetooth connections are made via Piconets, a Piconet is simply 2 or more devices
which occupy the same physical channel.  1 device in the Piconet is the master and the
rest are slaves, all communication takes place via the master device (i.e. slaves cannot
communicate directly).  A device can participate in multiple Piconets, but can only ever
be the master of 1.  Multiple Piconets linked in this way are termed Scatternets.
Although the Bluetooth design acknowledges these ad-hoc Scatternets, the specification
does   not   include   details   of   how   they   should   operate,   thus   there   are   few   if   any
implementations.  The low data rates and short range offered by most Bluetooth devices,
has resulted in 802.11 becoming the dominant technology for wireless networking at the
IP   layer.     However   Bluetooth   continues   to   be   popular   as   a   "cable   replacement"
technology on phones, PDA's and other personal devices.Mesh Networking
In his paper[4] Shepard introduces the concept of a rooftop network, such networks use
low power wireless equipment placed on the rooftops of many buildings to communicate
with other nearby nodes as shown in Figure 1.
Nodes forward traffic co-operatively for each other, thus facilitating communication
between all nodes on the network even though they may not have a direct connection
with each other.
This is the area in which I initially focused my research, I intended to see if such
networks were practical, what routing protocols would be suitable and how they scaled.
The goal was to create an open infrastructure which could provide wide area wireless
coverage.
Security would be managed on a per service basis much like the current Internet.  For
example to get Internet access you could setup a secure VPN connection across the
network to a trusted gateway, perhaps located in your own home or business.  In this
way you have wireless coverage across a large area without having to authenticate
users on a global scale.
Based on the community wireless model no central organisation would deploy this
network, rather individuals and businesses would put up nodes on their own property to
gain access.  Thus when a user gains access they also simultaneously expand coverage
allowing more people to connect.  This approach requires a cheap, license-free radio
technology and a routing protocol with good scalability.
Figure 1: A typical mesh networkBridging
The simplest approach is not to use routing at all but rely on standard Ethernet layer
802.1d  bridging[5], in fact  many smaller mesh networks take this very approach.
Bridging has the benefit of allowing clients to migrate between access points since it is
effectively   just   a   single   flat   network,   however   bridging   introduces   introduces   in-
efficiencies in all but the simplest network topologies.
The problems arise from the fact that loops in Ethernet are prohibited, therefore a mesh
network that wishes to present itself as a flat network must also be loop free.   The
spanning tree protocol used in 802.1d will disable links in a network such that a
topology with loops becomes a tree instead.  If one of the links in use should go down
the algorithm runs again and a previously disabled link will become active to maintain
connectivity.
Spanning tree is a tried and tested mechanism for allowing redundant links between
core bridges in a network, however it does not apply well to the wireless scenario.
Consider the fully-connected topology shown in Figure 2.
We cannot run this topology as a flat network since it contains loops therefore we must
enable spanning tree, this could create several different topologies, of which Figure 3 is
an example.
Figure 2:
Fully Connected TopologyNow each of the access points can be safely bridged together into a single Ethernet
segment, however this topology will restrict the available bandwidth between some of
the access points, for example nodes 3 and 4 previously had a direct link but now traffic
must be relayed via node 1.
In a wired network this is of little consequence, it will use up some of the switching
capacity on node 1 and latency will be marginally higher but neither of these are likely
to cause problems.  However in the wireless case this relaying will halve the throughput
of the network.  This is due to wireless being a shared medium like an Ethernet Hub,
since all the nodes are operating on the same frequency (which they must in order to
exchange data) only 1 may transmit at any time.
Thus node 4 will actually receive traffic from node 3 twice, the first time it will be
discarded (as it is addressed to node 1), and then secondly once it has been relayed by
node 1.
Hence bridging is a very inefficient solution, to better it we must move higher in the
network stack and make use of IP layer routing protocols.
Traditional Routing Protocols
Traditional large scale routing requires a strict hierarchical architecture in order to
scale efficiently, as shown by the aggregation typically found between Department,
Organisation, ISP and the Internet.  Without such aggregation the Internet could not
function, as of August 2004 there are 140,606 routing prefixes announced
4 compared to
4 Source: http://www.cidr-report.org/
Figure 3:
Bridged Topologyan estimated 233,101,481 hosts
5.  Thus on average there are approximately 1,600 hosts
for each prefix announced, an aggregation of more than 3 orders of magnitude.
It should also be noted that many still consider the current routing table to be un-
acceptably   large,   consequently   with   IPv6   additional   levels   of   aggregation   are
encouraged to incur less routing overhead in the Internet core.
However in a meshed network very little aggregation is possible as addresses are
usually allocated at random and the hierarchical nature of physical connectivity found
on the Internet is not present.  I have provided a brief overview of two popular routing
protocols, RIP and OSPF.
RIP
Wired   network   routing   protocols   typically   work   using   the   Bellman-Ford[6][7]  or
"Distance Vector" algorithms, one of the simplest protocols based on this algorithm is
RIP[8].
In RIP each router keeps a table containing for each destination:
• Gateway: the first gateway along the route to the destination.
• Interface: the physical network which must be used to reach the first gateway.
• Metric: a number, indicating the distance (number of hops) to the destination.
• Timer: the amount of time since the entry was last updated.
Routers send updates to each other by exchanging these tables.  If a router receives an
update for a destination with a lower metric than it is currently using it will replace that
entry in it's table, so as to always use the shortest path.
RIP works well for small networks, however as the size increases 2 problems are
encountered.  Firstly the size of the tables exchanged hosts grows unacceptably large
and secondly whenever the topology changes (such as following a link failure) a routing
update is triggered.  These two issues combined means that in larger and more dynamic
networks the routing table can consume a sizeable amount of the total bandwidth
available.
5 Based on the number of DNS hostnames, Source: http://www.isc.org/ops/ds/reports/2004-01/RIP is also limited by design to networks with a maximum diameter of 15 hops, this is to
prevent routing loops from forming during updates.
OSPF
In OSPF[9] each router maintains a database describing the entire network topology.
From the topology database each router constructs a tree of the shortest path to each
router using the Dijkstra algorithm[10].  This is used to select the next-hop router when
forwarding packets.
OSPF is a Link State protocol, meaning that routing updates are triggered by network
links being operational or not.   When a change occurs it is propagated to all other
routers.
The drawbacks of OSPF are that it has a high router overhead, in unstable or frequently
changing topologies a router may find itself continuously re-building the shortest-path
tree.  On a graph with m edges and n vertices Dijkstra (and thus OSPF) has been shown
to run in either  ( Θ n2) or  ( Θ m + n log n) for smaller graphs[11].
Ad-Hoc Routing Protocols
These traditional protocols would quite plainly not be adequate since I was interested in
protocols that could scale to cover an entire city and beyond, so I began to look at
alternative approaches.
The majority of recent routing protocol research has taken place in the MANET
6 area,
with an emphasis on scalability and good response to rapid topology changes.
Ad-hoc routing protocols fall into 2 camps, pro-active or table driven and re-active or on-
demand.   A pro-active router knows all the possible destinations in the network in
advance, RIP and OSPF are both pro-active.  A re-active router only seeks a destination
once it receives a packet for it, this can help scalability at the expense of increased
initial latency.
6 IETF Mobile Ad-hoc Networks Working Group:
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/manet-charter.htmlLocation Based Routing
The use of geographic data for scalable routing in large scale networks has been
considered before.  It was first discussed by Gregory Finn in 1987[12] as a mechanism
for   dealing   with   Metropolitan   scale   networks   by   using   latitude   and   longitude   as
components of a hosts network address.  Routers in such networks are aware of their
position and that of their neighbours, when they receive a packet the destination
address tells them the destination host's physical location.
Finn envisaged a scenario where city blocks were linked to each other directly rather
than via  the Internet  and  an  ISP  as  is commonplace  today.    Although Finn  was
considering wired links the basic principles of geographic forwarding that he outlines
are equally applicable to wireless medium.
His proposal was that packets are forwarded greedily, that is to a neighbour nearer to
the destination than the current node, until no such node exists or the packet has
reached it's destination.  If no closer node exists then it is assumed that there is an
obstacle and the current node floods the packet to all of it's neighbours until a node with
a neighbour closer to the destination is reached and greedy forwarding can be resumed,
as shown in Figure 4.
Solid lines represent greedy forwarding and dotted lines flooding.  Duplicate packets
can occur when a flooded packet arrives at 2 closer nodes.
Work since then, such as GPSR[13] has worked in the constraints of traditional 32 bit IP
addressing which is too small to encode geographic data, instead protocols have relied
on a dedicated location server which routers query to find the physical location of a
Figure 4: Cartesian Floodingdestination.  Convergence of geographic addressing with IP and in particular IPv6 is
briefly discussed in GeoCast[14], IPv6 addresses are sufficiently large that it's possible
to encode the location data in the address itself.  In his Internet Draft[15] Tony Hain
demonstrates this very principle, showing how geographic locations can be used to form
a provider independent address.  As an example 20 bits of address space can be used to
cover a region of approx 26 square km at a resolution of 6.4m square.  The mechanism
detailed also makes use of bit interleaving, meaning that shorter prefixes cover large
areas, as more bits are used the accuracy increases.  For example 16 bits refer to an
area 104km
2 in size, 32 bits 407m
2 and 44 bits just 6.4m
2.
GPSR is neither truly pro-active or re-active, whilst it is not table driven it does not have
to search for each new route.
Fisheye State Routing
Fisheye   State   Routing   (FSR)[16]  is   based   on   a   link   state   protocol,   enhanced   by
propagating updates less quickly as the distance from the source increases.  If mobility
is high then obsolete data will be dropped at outer nodes due to these forwarding
delays, consequently routing updates do not flood the entire network.  Although distant
nodes may have outdated routing information as packets approach their destination the
accuracy of the routing tables increases, compensating for this.
Fisheye is primarily designed as a mechanism to reduce routing traffic in networks with
high mobility rates which is not a large issue in rooftop mesh networks, however the
design philosophy is an elegant one which may be of use in different contexts.
Clustering
Clustering has been used in several protocols[17],[16] and is an extension of the clubs
algorithm[18].  Clustering is the process by which individual nodes group themselves
dynamically, there are several mechanisms to do this, including simply emulating the
wireless topology (where clusters represent a group of directly connected nodes), or by
some algorithmic method such as that described in clubs.
In   HSR   the   clustering   process   is   repeated   recursively   to  form   multiple   layers   of
"clusters", Level 0 is the physical layer, Level 1 clusters comprise solely of the Level 0leaders (cluster heads), Level 2 of the Level 1 leaders and so on, 2 levels of clustering
are shown in Figure 5.  Clusters are comprised of 2 basic node types, gateway nodes
(hollow circles) and internal nodes (solid circles) and cluster heads (solid squares).
Gateway nodes are present wherever 2 clusters meet and are responsible for forwarding
traffic between the 2 cluster heads.
Addressing in HSR is directly linked to the hierarchical structure and is defined as being
the sequence of MAC addresses of nodes that must be traversed to reach the destination
node from the highest level.
Figure 5:
Hierarchical ClusteringTest bed network
We have deployed a small test bed network as part of a local community wireless
initiative called SOWN
7.  The network has provided us with invaluable data and hands-
on experience of the problems one can expect to encounter at the wireless layer.
Issues Encountered
• Throughput
The biggest realisation was the poor levels of throughput one can expect from a meshed
network, when a packet is being forwarded across many hops only 1 node in 3 can
transmit at once, see Figure 6.
The   net   effect   of   this   is   that   with   standard   802.11b   throughput   is   reduced   to
approximately 1Mbit of TCP traffic across many hops, and that bandwidth is shared
across surprisingly large regions of a mesh network.
By using multiple radio's in each node one can reduce or even eliminate these problems,
however when using multiple radios the antenna must be positioned some distance from
each other to avoid cross-channel interference due to physical proximity.
• Transmitter Location
Since the transmit powers used in the 2.4GHz range are heavily limited to get long-
distance  communications  requires  line of  sight  between endpoints.    This typically
requires   external   aerials   and   a   significant   installation   process,   far   more   than   is
reasonable if wide-scale deployment is required.
• Background Noise
As the number of transmitters in the system increases so will the background noise,
7 Southampton Open Wireless Network – http://www.sown.org.uk
Figure 6: Overlapping Transmissionsmaking connections between nodes less reliable and reducing throughput.
• Malicious Nodes
As with many distributed systems it would be very hard to detect and isolate a malicous
node (for example advertising a false default route) automatically.  
• Latency
The process of encoding and de-coding a wireless signal takes time, approximately
several ms before transmission delays are considered.  This is because checksums must
be calculated on the entire packet before it is transmitted.  Thus in a large network with
many nodes communications over many hops are likely to be high in latency.Sharing Connectivity
My interests lie primarily in creating a de-centralized "organic" style network providing
ubiquitous connectivity and it was apparent that a well performing wireless mesh would
require a high level of design and careful deployment.   Thus I began to look at
alternative approaches to achieve this goal.
Until now I had ignored the increasingly widespread availability of broadband Internet
connectivity since providing other users with access is often against the contract used
by an ISP.  What's more you are held personally responsible for the actions of that user,
for example if your connection was used to send spam email, it is likely your ISP would
hold you in breach of contract.
I devised a system called InterIP which allowed users to connect via the Internet to their
home network, from which they can use their own Internet connection.  Thus if a user
does send spam email it will be via their own connection, and they will be the liable.
InterIP
First we must reserve some IP address space for InterIP, for example 10.0.0.0/8.  This
space is split, let us assume into 256 class C networks. There must also exist a reverse
DNS infrastructure for 10.0.0.0/8, although it can appear anywhere in public DNS, e.g.
10.in-addr.sown.org.uk
For each class C network there exists one or more InterIP lease servers. An InterIP lease
server is effectively a DHCP server for an entire network block, we shall assume the
blocks are /28 networks (16 IPs). As with DHCP leases must be renewed periodically or
they may be assigned to other nodes. 
A node is simply a router running InterIP, there are 2 types of node, those directly
connected to the Internet with at least 1 public IP address are gateway nodes, those
without a public IP are slave nodes and must be connected to at least one gateway node
via a LAN. Slave nodes will be discussed in more depth later, until then we shall use the
term "node" to mean a "gateway node". 
When a new node is installed it selects an InterIP lease server, this could be random orbased on some property such as geographic location, the discovery and selection
mechanism is not important provided it evenly distributes nodes between lease servers. 
The node requests a network allocation from the InterIP lease server, if granted server
publishes a forward DNS entry corresponding to the public IP of that node for each of
the reverse hostnames in that block. 
For example if the lease was for 10.1.2.0/28 and the node resided at the public IP
123.123.123.123 then the entries would be: 
0.2.1.10.in-addr.sown.org.uk. IN A 123.123.123.123
1.2.1.10.in-addr.sown.org.uk. IN A 123.123.123.123
2.2.1.10.in-addr.sown.org.uk. IN A 123.123.123.123
...
15.2.1.10.in-addr.sown.org.uk. IN A 123.123.123.123
When another node receives a packet destined to a non-local InterIP address it performs
a forward DNS lookup corresponding to the destination, this will return the public IP of
that node. The InterIP packet is then encapsulated into a normal IP packet and sent to
that public address. Upon receipt of such an encapsulated InterIP packet it is first
checked to ensure that the destination of the InterIP packet is in a valid and local
InterIP range, if this requirement is met then it is simply de-encapsulated and forwarded
according to the local routing table.
Slave nodes
If a node does not have a public IP then it is deemed to be a slave node and must be
connected to one or more gateway nodes e.g. via a local area network. The slave node
will request the gateway node for transit, if granted the gateway node will contact an
InterIP lease server on behalf of the slave, and an additional InterIP block will be
assigned and routed via the gateway.
Multihoming
If gateway nodes are connected via some other means than the Internet such as a
community wireless network they may choose to perform multi-homing for each othersblocks. Gateway 1 requests transit from gateway 2, if granted then gateway 1 will
contact the InterIP lease server instructing it to add additional DNS entries for the
public IP of gateway 2. Reusing the previous example, if the public IP of gateway 2 is
99.98.97.96 the DNS zone file would now look like: 
0.2.1.10.in-addr.sown.org.uk. IN A 123.123.123.123
IN A 99.98.97.96
1.2.1.10.in-addr.sown.org.uk. IN A 123.123.123.123
IN A 99.98.97.96
2.2.1.10.in-addr.sown.org.uk. IN A 123.123.123.123
IN A 99.98.97.96
Now when a node in a different IP network receives packets to 10.1.2.2 it will perform
the lookup as before but this time receive multiple gateways, encapsulated packets can
then be distributed between these gateways increasing the overall bandwidth available
between the 2 sites. 
Drawbacks
A prototype implementation (without the lease server) worked well, building a virtual
network over the Internet in the 10.0.0.0/8 address space.   The drawbacks are an
inefficient use of bandwidth and high complexity for users as they would require an
InterIP aware router and VPN server on their home network.Trust
It was at this time that I decided I had perhaps been avoiding the main issue , namely of
allowing people to share their Internet connectivity directly with other trustworthy
individuals.
To demonstrate the security issues let us assume that everybody runs their wireless
network "open" (without authentication) such that any client can connect.   The first
problem is that you are allowing unknown users direct access to your own internal
network, a wireless LAN could be deployed outside a firewall, but typically you want to
be able to access internal resources from your own wireless network so this is counter-
productive.   The second problem is that of providing anonymous Internet access, if
somebody uses your Internet connection to download illegal content, hack into a server,
send spam email or any number of other uses prohibited by your ISP then you are likely
to be held  responsible and  would be unable to provide little conclusive evidence
otherwise.
We want to avoid locking down the network totally though, we want our friends, family
and colleagues to be able to connect without having to setup individual devices or give
out passwords, in general we want to provide access to people that we trust not to
abuse the network.  Ideally the system could authenticate people that are trustworthy
despite them being not directly known, friend's of a friend and friend's of a relative are
obvious examples.
Existing Trust Mechanisms
The two most common trust mechanisms in use today are X.509 and PGP, a more recent
development is SPKI/SDSI however this is yet to see  wide-spread deployment.  In this
section I will consider these and other security mechanisms.
X.509
X.509[19] is the traditional Public Key Infrastructure, first developed in 1980's as part
of the X.500 specification which was an attempt to build a global "Internet Phone book".
X.509 is based around a global name space known as the Directory Information Tree
(DIT) which is comprised of many unique Distinguished Names (DNs).  The purpose of
an X.509 certificate is to bind a Distinguished Name to a public key, this binding issigned by a trusted third party known as the Certifying Authority (CA).  Only a single
signature is supported.
An X.509 certificate includes:
• Distinguished Name
• Public Key
• Expiry Date
• Digital Signature of the Issuer
• Distinguished Name of the Issuer
To find another user in X.500 you would simply consult the directory.   However the
global X.500 initiative failed, thus there is no standardised way to discover another
users certificate.  X.509 is generally considered to be overly complex and incomplete for
the following reasons:
1. The certificates are not human-readable and there are several different standards for
encoding them, this makes them annoying to handle and use.
2. CA's periodically produce Certificate Revocation Lists.  These are lists of Certificates
which have been revoked, typically either because their associated private key has
been compromised or the information it contained was found to be incorrect.  Clients
should  check   CRLs before  accepting   a certificate,  however   this is  often  poorly
implemented.   For example certificates issued by Verisign do not include the CRL
Distribution Point field defined in RFC2459[19] required for automatic checking.
3. Certifying Authorities typically do a minimal amount of checking to verify a users
identity.  Thus limiting the usefulness of a personal certificate.
PGP
PGP[20] differs from X.509 in that it is a totally distributed system, anybody can sign
anybody else's key thus everybody is in effect a type of Certifying Authority.  PGP relies
on  having   a   large   numbers   of   digital   signatures,   known   as   the   web   of   trust,   to
compensate for the fact that users are not trained to check or verify each others
identity.A PGP certificate includes:
• A unique ID
• A name (typically an email address)
• A PGP public key
• Digital signature of the users private key
• Digital signatures made by other users who have validated this certificate
Users have a keyring which is used to store the public keys of others.  Each key has two
associated attributes, whether or not it's authentic and the level of trust the user places
in that key.
The levels of trust and default behaviours are as follows:
• Yes - Accept and use certificates signed by this public key
• No - Don't use this key
• Maybe - Prompt
• Marginal - Requires several (by default 2) marginal keys to make the authentication
PGP was designed solely as a means to provide secure email, it is concerned only with
proof of identity and not more generic problems such as trustworthiness.
SPKI/SDSI
As its name suggests, SPKI/SDSI[21][22] is the combination of 2 specifications.  SDSI
[23]  was a proposal by Butler and Lampson, which took a "clean slate" approach to
security, attempting to deal with some of the problems discovered with X.509.  Their
work  was subsequently integrated  into the IETF  Simple Public Key Infrastructure
Working Group
8 and the resulting specification termed SPKI/SDSI or SPKI for short.
Perhaps the most defining aspect of SPKI is it's use of local name spaces, each user
maintains their own mapping from principals (public keys) to names.  A similar mapping
exists in PGP, however in PGP it is the key owner who defines the name rather than the
list owner.  In SPKI it is the responsibility of each individual to assign names much like
one would specify the names in a personal phone book.  These "phone books" may be
made public, in which case it is possible to build relative names, for example "the person
8 IETF Simple Public Key Infrastructure Working Group:
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/spki-charter.htmlwhom Alice refers to as Bob".
By using local name spaces a CA is no longer required to manage the global name space
to avoid clashes and more meaningful names can be assigned by users to their to keys.
The removal of the CA means that there is no central point of failure, and individuals are
free to set their own criteria before considering another key to be trustworthy.
SPKI defines Authorisation Certificates which allow permissions to be passed from one
key  to  another, the certificates have a delegation  bit which  denotes whether the
permission may be passed on to other keys.  These certificates bind a Tag to a public
key, a tag can be almost anything and simply represents a particular permission.  ACL's
can be used to reason about authorisation certificates, although they are not part of the
standard.
SPKI also permits groups to be defined within the certificate structure, allowing a user
to apply ACL's to multiple keys quickly and easily.
SPKI is oriented toward being online, that is it favours on-demand re-validation over
static CRL lists.  Users may provide online directories containing their namespace and
current Authorisation Certificates, these can be traced back to the originating key to
confirm legitimacy.
SPKI contains a fault tolerance method known as "K of N" or "Threshold",   this can
provide extra security by requiring that a key has been delegated an authorisation via a
number of independent sources.  For example if K is 2 and N is 3 and the subjects are
Alice, Bob and Carol then the user will have to present 2 different certificate chains
each of which pass through a different one the subjects specified.
KeyNote
KeyNote[24] is an evolution of PolicyMaker[25], which unlike the previous mechanisms
defines a framework or language in which permissions can be defined, delegated,
queries and evaluated.
Although SDSI has the scope for such a language it does not specify it, allowing
implementations to craft their own.  The KeyNote approach is precisely the opposite,allowing any KeyNote aware tool to evaluate and validate securtity permissions.
KeyNote consists of several core components:
• A language for describing actions which are controlled by the system
• A mechanism for identifying principals which are entities that can be authorised to
perform actions
• A language to describe policies which govern the actions a principal may perfom
• A language to specify credentials which allow principlas to delegate authorisations to
other principals.
These components are wrapped by a compliance checker which applications interface
with to verify whether a requested action should be granted.
A web of trust could be created in KeyNote in a similar fashion to SDSI, by requiring a
delegation of permission from one or more well known keys and relying on unknown
intermediate keys in the web.
The specification does not address the means by which credentials and principals are
obtained.  It uses a traditional global model for identities.
Components of Trust
Transitivity
The transitivity of trust has been an area of much discussion, the traditional perspective
being that trust is not transitive, in other words if Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts Cathy
then Alice cannot trust Cathy.  I consider this definition to be too clear cut as very often
trust is transitive, indeed the entire structure of x.509 certificates is built upon this fact
(although some may consider this to be a flaw).  For example in x.509, when a client
trusts a Certificate Authorities they are also indicating trust of every certificate issued
by that CA.
Quite   often   if   we   are   venturing   into   something   unknown   we   will   rely   on   the
recommendations   of   those   we   already   trust.     In   the   trust   domain   transitivity   is
conditional, it depends on the number of recommendations received, the trustworthinessof   those   doing   the   recommendations   and   the   importance   associated   with   this
relationship.  For example users may consider a large number of recommendations from
less well known individuals the same as a small number from close friends or family.
Reputation
Reputation as a mechanism for determining trust in distributed systems is a well proven
method for establishing trust as websites such as EBay have shown.  EBay provides a
"Feedback Forum" where after completing an auction the buyer and seller can give each
other either a positive or negative point, thus trustworthy sellers quickly gain a high
positive score allowing bidders to buy with greater confidence.  Sellers with low quality
goods or that provide bad service quickly gain negative feedback rendering their
account useless as few people are prepared to bid from a seller with poor reputation.
The Ebay system is not without it's flaws, there is nothing preventing a malicious seller
from setting up a new account after each auction to avoid negative feedback.  Likewise
they can also create false reputations by running several low value auctions, bidding for
these items from other factious accounts and giving themselves positive feedback.
Although this would cost a small amount in listing fees it would be easily recouped by
setting up several simultaneous high-value auctions. 
These problems and others stem from the fact that in reputation in Ebay is anonymous,
there is no mechanism to trace the path between buyer and seller.  For example if you
knew several other people who had bought from a buyer with success your confidence
would be much higher.  Taking this a step further it is not necessary to directly know
the previous bidders, if a user you have dealt with before has also dealt with this buyer
that still provides multiple independent paths between yourself and the bidder can be
identified then additional trust can be derived from this.
Several Certificate Authorities have begun programmes to support this type of notion.
Both   Thawte
9  and   CACert
10  offer   free   personal   email   certificates,   however   the
certificates are provided with the name field left blank.  To get these details filled in
they offer a public assurance program, this works by relying on members of the public
to certify each others identity, this works in much the same way as PGP key signing.
9 Thawte web of trust, http://www.thawte.com/html/COMMUNITY/wot/index.html
10CAcert assurance programme: http://www.cacert.org/index.php?id=3Users are encouraged to meet face to face with some photographic ID to certify each
others identity, they can then log on to the CA's website and record this.  After several
successful meetings the users identity is assumed valid and their certificate is updated
to include personal details.
In comparison the security of PGP is based around this concept from the ground up, its
certificates reflect this with their ability to accept multiple signatures.  Thus each time a
user verifies the identity of another they sign the others certificate directly.  With the
personal certificates this information is only available via central website and not stored
on the certificate itself.
Reputation in general has been well discussed in [26][27], and is generally considered to
be an excellent means of gaining trust.  However neither PGP nor Personal Certificates
offer any further information as to the nature of any meeting or signing.  For example
there is no way to discriminate between close friends and family or somebody you meet
on the train.  You may be equally sure of their identity (assuming the train passenger is
carrying ID) so it would be appropriate to assign them equal ratings,   however you
would not share the same level of trust with them.
Wireless Security Mechanisms
In this section I will consider how security has implemented in different wireless
technologies.
802.11
802.11 includes several security mechanisms, which I will discuss below.
MAC Filtering
This is the most basic form of security, access points can be configured with ACL lists
restricting the MAC addresses which can connect.  This is relatively easy to overcome as
an attacker can sniff traffic to find a working MAC and hijack it.  Despite these flaws
MAC filtering is widely used as it requires no client side support or setup.
In many environments MAC filtering is typically deployed alongside a web login which
dynamically adds allowed MAC addresses after a successful login.   This is worryingsince if a malicious user hijacks another's connection then all the logs will point to the
innocent party thus falsely incriminating him.
An open source web login known as NoCat is commonly used in community wireless
networks, it too provides dynamic MAC address filters.   There are several different
back-end   authentication   mechanisms   including   RADIUS   and   their   own   protocol
implemented using GnuPG
11 and SSL.
WEP
The original 802.11 specification includes a Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) algorithm
which is widely acknowledged to have several flaws[28].  The most relevant of these is
that the protocol relies on a shared secret configured on both client and access point,
thus restricting it's usefulness in deployments of more than a few people.  There are also
cryptographic flaws, the details of which are not relevant here, suffice to say that given
adequate data (which can be gathered by simply listening to traffic), it is possible to
determine the shared secret.
802.1x
In June 2001 the IEEE approved the 802.1x
12  standard which defines "Port Based
Network Access Control", a generic authentication system for networks.   Originally
designed for use in wired networks it has proven workable in the wireless realm.  802.1x
defines extensions to EAP[29] (Extensible Authentication Protocol) called EAPOL (EAP
Over LAN) allowing it to work directly at the network layer.  Authentication is handled
by a back end RADIUS server, allowing each user to have a unique user name and
password.
EAP itself supports several numerous different authentication mechanisms, including
MD5, TLS, TTLS, PEAP.  Encryption in wireless networks is provided by a rotating WEP
key, with each client having a different key thus preventing snooping between clients.
11GNU Pricay Guard, an open source OpenPGP implementation: http://www.gnupg.org/
12IEEE 802.1x: http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.1X-2001.pdfWPA and 802.11i
WEP and 802.1x are soon to be replaced with 802.11i
13, which at the time of writing has
recently been ratified.   WPA
14  (Wi-Fi Protected Access) was conceived as a stop-gap
solution by the WiFi Alliance
15, it was effectively a snapshot and subset of an earlier
draft of 802.11i.  WPA has now been superseded by WPA2 which fully implements the
802.11i specification.  802.11i specifies encryption methods superior to those used by
WEP and includes support for 802.1x as standard.
802.11i defines several new security algorithms under the heading of "Robust Security
Network Association" or RSNA.  An RSNA can be established using either pre-shared
keys or by using IEEE 802.1x.  802.11i is primarily concerned with the definition of new
encryption algorithms to achieve the RSNA and  address the flaws found in the RC4
based WEP methods.
802.11i uses Open System authentication, this means that any station can connect to the
access point at the most basic level although they will not be able to exchange traffic
until an additional authentication mechanism has been completed.  Thus it is possible
for denial of service attacks to be launched, whereby an attacker masquerades as a
legitimate user and sends a de-association to the access point, resulting in the legitimate
user being disconnected.  A flood of such de-association requests would prevent use of
that access point.  Whilst some people consider this a major shortfall others point out
that an equally effective denial of service attack would be to flood the radio channel with
noise against which there is no protection.
Bluetooth
Bluetooth security is based on a challenge-response scheme.  One party (the verifier)
sends a challenge (a random number) to the other party (the claimant).  The claimant
calculates a response which is a function of the challenge, it's own Bluetooth address
and a secret key.  The secret key comprises of a user defined PIN, a random number and
the other devices Bluetooth address.  This process is termed pairing.
This initial key is used to exchange 2 more random numbers (generated by each device)
13IEEE 802.11i: http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/
14WPA: http://www.wi-fi.com/OpenSection/protected_access.asp
15The WiFi Alliance: http://www.wi-fi.com/which is combined with the respective devices Bluetooth address, finally these are
combined in an XOR to give the 128-bit link key for this pairing.
There are some relatively minor flaws in Bluetooth security surrounding the initial key
exchange, due to pin-numbers typically being only 4 digits long.  If an attacker is able to
snoop this exchange then they can easily iterate through all the possible pin numbers
and thus decode the final 128 bit key.  By spoofing their device address they would then
be able communicate directly with either device.
A second flaw is that the Bluetooth device ID could be used to track users, however a
similar criticism could be levelled at MAC addresses in Ethernet cards.  Many phone
users upgrade to new models every few years, thus this tracking information would be
of limited use and accuracy.
The Bluetooth solution is totally distributed but at the same time very rigid.  For any 2
devices to communicate with each other they must undergo pairing, which requires
control of both devices.
Wireless Authentication Service
All the authentication mechanisms currently available on wireless devices are based on
either shared pass phrase (e.g. WEP) or a global database (e.g. 802.1x).   Neither
approach is suitable for creating communities of trusted users as different scenarios
require different levels of trust.  WEP
Individuals   naturally   have  differing   views   on  who  they  consider   trustworthy,  thus
traditional global password databases are not useful.
A good system would provide users with credentials (be they a user ID and password or
digital certificate) which work with all access points that they have permission to use.
This creates an interesting problem, as we require globally unique identifiers with
localised access control, something currently not offered by any wireless authentication
mechanism.
Thus whilst a global system is needed, whether or not a user is authenticated will
depend on the owner of the device they are trying to use.A Community Trust Service
As a preliminary project in this area I decided to implement a community oriented
802.1x service.  Designed for use in the home, it allows people to specify groups of users
who can use their access point.  Ultimately the goal is to allow any reputable user to use
any access point registered in the system, thus enabling people to share connectivity
with relatively good security.
One of my main goals for this service was to maintain compatibility with existing client
implementations, I decided to use 802.1x as the basic authentication type as it requires
no additional hardware at end-users sites beyond the access point and it allows me to
place the enhanced functionality I required into a central RADIUS server rather than
having to client implementations.
In order to use the service a user must first register a user account, this process is
anonymous with the only check being an optional email address verification.   The
rational behind this being that if you have an email address at a well known corporation
this provides a fairly good indicator of your identity.   Next the user registers their
access points with the system, this includes a public IP address and a shared secret used
to encrypt the RADIUS communication.  Finally they may specify which communities
can use their access points, they can use groups defined by other people or create their
own, each access point can permit several different communities.
A community is essentially a group of people who have mutual trust for each other.
Communities have administrators who are users with extra privileges allowing them to
control who belongs to the community, they have a responsibility for checking the
identity of users joining the community and evicting those who have abused the trust.
The service itself works using some simple modifications to the back end RADIUS
server, when the server receives an authentication request it checks the source IP
address against its database of registered access points, if it finds a match then it
examines the user ID requesting to connect, these 2 items are cross referenced against
a list of communities to see if both node and user are present in the same community.
Following this authentication proceeds as it would with a traditional RADIUS server (i.e.
Password/certificate checks), if any stage of the process fails the request is denied.Results
The service worked quite well, but highlighted several problem areas, discussed below.
•  How can users verify that other users are who they claim to be online?  If the other
user is unknown, short of having a face to face meeting this is hard to achieve
• Even small communities pose management  problems,  for  example  when a  user
applies to join a community which administrator should check their identity etc.  This
is mainly a problem of communication between administrators
• Too much responsibility is placed on the administrators (ID checking etc), in addition
to this users have to accept their standards of verification
• Users potentially have to re-prove their identity for each community they join
• The system is still centralized, thus prone to scalability problems and a directed
attack from parties wishing to gain access.
• The trust relationships are only imposed by the server and are not part of the
certificate structure, weakening the overall security.
Proposed Improvements
I intend to simplify the service to more closely mimic the trust relationships found in
PGP or SPKI.  Users will be able to nominate other users whom they trust, and specify
transitivity of that trust on a per-user basis.  They will also be able to specify a general
hop-limit on the maximum distance a user may be from themselves.  This should remove
the complexity and overhead of the community approach whilst allowing users to have
control over who may use their access point.
SPKI Wireless LAN Authentication
An alternative to introducing the concepts of reputation and transitivity into a back end
RADIUS  server  is  to use a  security  protocol  with  these  concepts  built  in.    Both
SPKI/SDSI and PGP are good candidates for this.
I choose SPKI primarily due to it's ACL support, whereas PGP only allows users to vouch
for each others identity and not whether you consider them to be trustworthy.Requirements
Any wireless authentication scheme must support mutual authentication, that is to say
that the server must also prove its identity to the client as well as the other way around.
This is to prevent malicious entities from setting up false authentication servers and
harvesting user credentials.
Secondly since the authentication is performed over the wireless medium it must be
secure against replay attacks, i.e. recording a successful authentication and then re-
sending the packets to gain access and man in the middle attacks where an attacker
masquerades as a legitimate access point.
Lastly since this authentication mechanism could potentially run on access points it
should have a minimal server-side overhead.
Initial Protocol Design
Based on these requirements I designed a proof of concept authentication protocol using
SPKI.  This is a 2 stage protocol, in the first stage the client and server verify each
others identity, in the second stage the authentication itself is performed.  The design of
the protocol borrows heavily from TLS[29]  and related work on integrating TLS and
SPKI[30]. indeed a full integration with TLS is under consideration and would appear
feasible based on other work, but not relevant to this proof of concept implementation.
The client begins communications by sending a "ClientHello" message to the server.
The server responds with a "ServerHello" followed by a random challenge string.  The
client signs this string with it's SPKI private key and forwards the signature (including
it's public key) to the server which verifies it's authenticity.
The client then generates its own random challenge which is sent to the server.  Now it
is the servers turn to sign the string and send the signature to the client, which in turn
verifies the signature.
At this point mutual authentication has occurred, both client and server can be sure that
the other holds a valid public/private key pair.  The public keys exchanged must be thesame as those in the following stages of authentication.
Now the Server sends the client a Tag, this represents the permission token required to
authenticate with the server.  For the client to authenticate it must present a certificate
chain running from the Servers public key to it's own, with each certificate containing
the permission tag.
This certificate sequence is sent to the server which verifies it and allows or denies the
client as appropriate.
Limitations
The design requires that the access point itself has a certificate and that clients can
present a certificate chain terminating with that certificate.  This would appear to have
drawbacks, firstly when a user changes their access point they will have to re-configure
all their devices with the new certificate and secondly if you have multiple access points
then you will need to be able to create a certificate chain for each one.
One could address this problem by configuring the access point to authenticate based
on some other Principal, this would require modification to the second half of the
protocol, with the access point now having to provide both Tag and Principal.
However, this creates problems of it's own, allowing an attacker to setup a rogue access
point  in   order   to   gain   information   regarding   the   certificate   structures   used.     By
masquerading as a legitimate access point and requiring the normal Tag and principal
pair clients would present their complete certificate chains.  Whilst such chains are of
little use themselves they will highlight which individuals can delegate the tag required
for access, marking them as targets.
To prevent such attacks an additional stage could be introduced requiring the access
point to prove it's legitimacy by providing a certificate chain from the owners principal
to its own.  Although this would require that the client has a local copies of every key
used in the chain in order to verify it.
Since it is the clients responsibility to produce a certificate chain and the fact that it
must do this before having connectivity means that clients need to have a local copy ofthe certificate chain.  This is plausible in a restricted environment where you know the
owner of an access point in advance, but of little use in a more general setting when
connecting to an unknown access points.Toward a distributed model
To counter the "unknown access point" problem the requirement to produce a certificate
chain needs to be moved   away  from the client to  either the access point or an
authentication server.  SPKI encourages users to make their keyring available online,
thus the information required to produce a certificate chain may be scattered across
several servers.
The process of discovering and building a certificate chain is a shortest path problem.  If
one builds a graph of the trust relationships with keys as vertexes and signatures as
edges then we can map the possible different routes from one key to another.  Of course
such a graph would be distributed over many key servers in reality, meaning that the
searches required to produce a chain will be very bandwidth intensive.
For example to fully search every key in 5 hop path, with each key having 10 signatures
would require examining 5
10 or 9,765,625 keys.   Assuming 256 bytes per query, this
would result in ~2.3GB of traffic!   Thus more efficient or certainly more distributed
querying mechanisms must be found.
A standard Authorisation Tag will have to be used.  For example, a tag containing the
string  "FreeNetworks.org"  could signify that one entity may use the access  point
belonging to another entity.
Recall that SPKI Tags represent permissions which are passed between entities using
Authorisation Certificates and that SPKI allows these certificates to be delegated in a
binary fashion (i.e. full delegation permissions or not at all).   When a tag has been
delegated the entity can sign other keys using the same tag and it is as if the original
entity signed it.  The entity can also choose whether or not to delegate the permission
further.  By using a common tag and repeated delegation it's possible to build up a web
of trust similar to that created by PGP key signings.
Strongly Connected Components
A strongly connected graph is defined as a directed graph that has a path from each and
every vertex to every other vertex.Applied to SPKI it means that a tag has been delegated such that a path exists between
all entities.  In the PGP web of trust the strongest set is the largest strongly connected
set.
This raises an interesting property which is that if two entities believe they are in the
strongest set, do they need to find a route between them to establish trust or just prove
they are each a member of the strongest set?  If both entities are in the strongest set
then any path between them must also be in that set, including the shortest path.  If
either entity is not in the strongest set then this approach fails, otherwise unless we
wish to impose trust "hop limits" it is valid.
Perhaps the simplest method of identifying whether an entity is a member of the
strongest set is to require them to provide a signature chain to one or more well known
members.  By “well known” I refer to entities which are well connected, that is they
have a high number of signatures, potentially making them easier to locate due to
searches having to go less deep.  These well known entities must not be static since they
will   invariably   become   compromised   or   redundant   at   some   point,   for   example
maintaining a list of the 10% most connected entities from which 3 are randomly picked
should be sufficient.
Such a scheme simplifies our task greatly as not only are our possible destinations
limited but due to their highly connected nature should be easier to locate.  From my
earlier work in wireless routing I believed that some of the MANET protocols could
possible be adapted to this task.  Many of the MANET protocols rely geographic/short
range   nature   of   wireless   communications   (For   example   FSR,   GPSR,   Clubs,   etc).
Naturally the graphs generated by key signings and tag delegations do not strictly
follow this pattern, although geographic bunching may be present I do not expect it to
be a fundamental feature.
Another consideration is that the protocol must support asymmetric links, in MANET
networks this refers to a link in which traffic passes in one direction only, in this context
it refers  to when   one  entity has  signed another's key  but there is no reciprocal
signature.  Few MANET protocols have this capability.
Further analysis on the suitability of various routing protocols is still required, howevera   protocol   which   can   recognise   and   take   advantage   of   some   nodes   being   better
connected than others should be suitable.  Of particular interest is a greedy approach,
where the best connected neighbouring entity is always queried first.  This relies on the
most well connected members having a high degree of connectivity with each other.
In addition since the two endpoints can communicate with alternative approaches may
be applicable, for example co-operatively negotiating a route, or flooding from both ends
at once.
Preliminary Analysis of the PGP Web of Trust
Whilst I am aiming to use SPKI as my authentication scheme the underlying tag
delegation has similar properties to PGP public key signatures.  Thus to test different
approaches   for   this   problem   I   am   using   a   worldwide   keyring   obtained   from
http://www.pgp.net.
For my initial analysis I used a reduced set of approximately 100,000 keys, of this
roughly 10,000 were fully connected with each other.  For each of these keys I traced
the path to the 2 best connected keys, that is the keys with the most inbound and
outbound signatures.
Figure 7 shows the average number of signatures a key on that path has in relation to
it's distance from the target.  It clearly shows the number of signatures increasing as
the destination is reached, although this is quite subdued after 4-5 hops.
Figure 7: Signatures versus distance from target keyFigure 8 shows how many times keys were used.  This is startlingly logarithmic and
shows that very few keys were re-used in different paths, we can conclude that the  key-
set is both dense and well connected thus the optimal routes are often unique.
Resilience to Attack
One potential problem with the strongest set is that as it's size increases it becomes
more likely that an attacker can gain entry to the set.  Not only is it more likely that
somebody will be lax with regards to whom they delegate a permission to, but the sheer
size of the set will make it a more appealing target and thus subject to more attempts of
infiltration.  In the worse case the set will cease to be trustworthy in the eyes of its
members.
The K of N aspect of SPKI was designed to deal with this, however it is far from a water-
tight solution.  I believe that in a large set it would only provide marginal improvements
in trustworthiness, at the cost of excluding many legitimate users.  Further analysis of
data is required to verify this.
However, I believe that the strongest set would be self-regulating provided the number
of individuals able to delegate the permission is kept to a minimum.  If  an intruder is
discovered then the people responsible for approving him can be petitioned to retract
that delegation or face having their delegation permission revoked in turn.  The ability
Figure 8: Total number of appearances made
by keys in all pathsto revoke certificates is key to this and only SPKI provides a robust means in which to do
this.Conclusion and Future Work
Despite my current research being in a vastly different field to the one I started in many
of the   problems are similar.   Establishing trust in large communities is a complex
problem, I have shown that the structure of such communities bears some resemblance
to that of ad-hoc wireless networks.  Consequently the routing protocols and techniques
devised in this field may be able to yield results superior to the shortest-path algorithms
traditionally used to establish a chain of trust.
Further research is also required, particularly in the area of graph theory and social
networks.  It has been shown that many distributed networks display similar properties
concerning the distribution of links, it would be interesting to see if the PGP web of trust
displays similar properties.
I intend to use the full world-wide PGP keyring, containing over 2 million keys, to
evaluate the effectiveness of  different shortest path strategies and their scalability in a
distributed environment.  I anticipate that the main evaluation criteria will be time taken
to establish a path, computational overhead and false-negatives (when a valid path is not
found but one exists).Bibliography
1: Telecommunications and Information Exchange between Systems -- Local and Metropolitan
Area Network -- Specific Requirements -- Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC)
and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 1999,
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.11.html
2: Supplement to 802.11-1999,Wireless LAN MAC and PHY specifications: Higher speed Physical
Layer (PHY) extension in the 2.4 GHz band, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
1999, 
3: Bluetooth Core Specification v1.2, Bluetooth SIG, 2003, https://www.bluetooth.org/spec/
4: Shepard, Timothy J., A Channel Access Scheme for Large Dense Packet Radio Networks, ,
Volume 26, Pages 219-230, 1996
5: Media Access Control (MAC) Bridges, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 1998,
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.1.html
6: Bellman, R, On a routing problem, Quarterly of Applied Mathematics, Volume 16, Pages 87-90,
1958
7: Ford, L; Fulkerson, D, Flows In Networks, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1962
8: RFC1058: Routing Information Protocol, IETF, 1988, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1058.txt
9: RFC1583: OSPF Version 2, IETF, 1994, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1583.txt
10: Dijkstra, E, A note on two problems in connection with graphs, Nuerische Mathematik,
Volume 1, Pages 269-271, 1959
11: Weiss, M, Data Structures and Algorithm Analysis in Java, 1999
12: Routing and Addressing Problems in Large MEtropolitan-scale Internetworks, , 1987, 
13: Karp, B; Kung, H, GPSR: Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing for Wireless Networks, 2000
14: T. Imielinski and J. Navas, GeoCast - Geographic Addressing and Routing, 1997
15: An IPv6 Provider-Independent Global Unicast Address Format, , 2003, 
16: Nagpal, Radhika & Coore, Daniel, An Algorithm For Group Formation In An Amorphous
Computer, 1998
17: C. Chiang and H. Wu and W. Liu and M. Gerla, Routing in Clustered Multihop, Mobile
Wireless Networks with Fading Channel, 1997
18: , An Algorithm For Group Formation In An Amorphous Computer, 1998
19: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile, Internet Engineering
Task Force, 1999, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt
20: Zimmermann, P, The Official PGP User's Guide, 1995
21: SPKI Requirements, , 1999, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2692.txt
22: SPKI Certificate Theory, , 1999, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2693.txt
23: Riverst, R; Lampson, B, SDSI - A Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure, 1996
24: The KeyNote Trust-Management System Version 2, , 1999, http://ietf.org/rfc/rfc2704.txt
25: M, Blaze; J, Feigenbaum; J, Lacy, Decentralized Trust Managment, 199626: Abdul-Rahman, A; Hailes, S, Supporting Trust in Virtual Communities, 2000
27: O'Hara, K, Trust - From Socrates To Spin, 2004
28: Borisov, N; Goldberg, I, Wagner, D, Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of
802.11, 2001
29: PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), , , http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2284.txt
30: SPKI Certificate Integration with Transport Layer Security (TLS) for Client Authentication and
Authorization, , 2001, http://www.tcs.tifr.res.in/~vishwas/pki/SPKI/draft-madhu-tls-spki-00.txt